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Abstract 
 
Amid a broader reckoning about the role of social 
media in public life, this article argues that the same 
scrutiny can be applied to the journalism studies field 
and its approaches to examining social media. A decade 
later, what hath such research wrought? We need a 
more particular accounting of the assumptions, biases, 
and blind spots that have crept into this line of research 
as well as the study of mediated conversations broadly. 
Our purpose is to provoke reflection and chart a path 
for future research by critiquing themes of what has 
come before. In particular, we seek to untangle three 
faulty assumptions—often implicit but no less 
influential—that have been overlooked in the rapid 
take-up of social media as a key phenomenon for 
journalism studies particularly and digital media 
studies generally: (1) that social media would be a net 
positive; (2) that social media reflects reality; and (3) 
that social media matters over and above other factors. 
 
 
1. Introduction 
 
In 2015, when the first author visited a U.S. 
metropolitan newspaper in the throes of trying to reinvent 
itself for the digital era, a management ultimatum had 
recently been delivered to the few reluctant late-adopters 
there: Be an active contributor on social media, or else. The 
message went something like this: If you’re not on Twitter, 
get an account already—and make sure you have at least a 
few hundred followers by the end of the year. We’ll be 
tracking your activity.1 The intensity of the message 
matched the urgency that the newspaper’s managers felt—
an urgency about meeting audiences where they were 
(increasingly on social platforms outside the newspaper’s 
control) and thereby steering those audiences back to the 
newspaper’s own proprietary platforms (its website and 
apps). The hope was that social media, once a curiosity 
beginning with MySpace in the mid-2000s and now 
suddenly the dominant means of public conversation, 
might be just the thing to save news organizations—to 
                                               
1 Personal communication, July 9, 2015; newspaper name withheld 
by agreement. 
revitalize, and hopefully monetize, audience attention in a 
world awash in attractive alternatives to news. To be active 
on Twitter and Facebook, as well as Snapchat, Instagram, 
and the rest, was seen by many news managers as an 
obvious and necessary step in journalism’s digital-first 
transformation. 
In many cases, journalists actually were ahead of their 
bosses as early and eager adopters of social media, 
embracing the opportunity to develop a personal brand, 
follow and converse with fellow journalists, seek new 
sources and ideas, and enjoy a metric-based manifestation 
that people indeed liked and shared their work. For many 
journalists, being on social media also meant being 
exposed to unruly publics and their criticisms, and feeling 
obligated to manage yet another platform around the clock. 
But the general story of social media and journalism, as 
told through public discourse and by now scores of 
academic studies published in the past decade, is one of 
journalists readily adopting and navigating an intriguing 
new space, overall adapting it to meet their needs and 
reaffirm their journalistic authority. More to the point, the 
collective hope for social media and journalism over the 
past decade, as painted especially in the trade press but also 
in the academic literature, has been one of implicit 
positivity: that, on balance, social media would be a net 
benefit for individual journalists, for journalism as an 
institution, and for society as a whole. 
How things have changed. Social media, once 
heralded for its role in democratic uprisings around the 
world and seen as a critical point of passage for activism in 
the digital age [80], is now being re-evaluated for its social 
impact, amid broader questions about data privacy, 
hacking, and government surveillance, as well as doxxing, 
harassment, and hate speech online [35][82]. Particularly 
in the United States but elsewhere as well, the public 
narrative about social media changed dramatically after the 
2016 election of President Donald J. Trump, which brought 
to the fore concerns about widespread malfeasance on 
social media—from “fake news,” propaganda, and 
coordinated disinformation to bot-based media 
manipulation and alt-right trolling and misogyny [50]. 
Summing up the increasingly sour mood by the end of 
2017, The Economist [79] was led to wonder, “Do social 
media threaten democracy? Facebook, Google and Twitter 
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were supposed to save politics as good information drove 
out prejudice and falsehood. Something has gone very 
wrong.” 
Perhaps the same could be said about the intersection 
of social media and journalism, particularly as situated 
within the broader study of mediated conversations and 
their implications for social life. At one level, there is the 
institutional threat of social media, as Google and 
Facebook vacuum up digital advertising revenue at an 
unprecedented rate, leading some observers to conclude 
that “[t]he influence of social media platforms and 
technology companies is having a greater effect on 
American journalism than even the shift from print to 
digital”; this because of the widespread takeover of 
traditional publishing roles by platforms that “have 
evolved beyond their role as distribution channels, and now 
control what audiences see and who gets paid for their 
attention, and even what format and type of journalism 
flourishes” [7]. But where publishers once embraced 
platforms as a new and possibly superior distribution 
method, many are now seeing referral traffic decline and 
some are even quitting Facebook, saying, “It’s been good 
for Facebook, but it hasn’t been good for us” (quoted in 
[64]). At another level is the lived experience of journalists 
on social media. While journalists have always faced 
criticism for their work, and while violence and 
intimidation against the press can be far more acute in 
repressive regimes [17], there is growing evidence that 
online culture generally and social media interactions 
specifically are contributing to a growing level of hostility 
and harassment for journalists in the West [74], particularly 
at a time when leading politicians in supposedly “safe” 
countries actively question the legitimacy of journalists 
and their work [9]. 
This moment of reckoning, both about social media 
and public life as well as social media and journalism 
practice, can be extended to include academic inquiries as 
well: A decade later, what hath research wrought? In the 
broad study of journalism and its digital transformation, 
few topics have captivated researchers in the past 10 years 
or so quite like social media—its use by journalists, its 
interstitial role between journalists and audiences, its 
ambient, ephemeral, and spreadable nature, and so much 
more. Now, after hundreds of studies on journalism and 
social media, we need a more particular accounting of the 
assumptions, biases, and blind spots that have crept into 
this line of research. To be sure, the research thus far has 
been far-reaching and richly informative, and a 
comprehensive review of such literature is beyond the 
scope of this paper (for overviews, see, e.g., [39][40]). 
Rather, our purpose is to offer a provocation for future 
research by critiquing themes of what has come before. In 
particular, our goal is to explain and untangle three key 
assumptions that have been overlooked in the rapid take-
up of social media as a key phenomenon for journalism 
studies and the wider study of digitally mediated 
conversations: (1) that social media would be a net 
positive; (2) that social media reflects reality; and (3) that 
social media matters over and above other factors. 
 
2. Background 
 
First, a brief word about how we are defining terms 
and contexts. The term “social media” has a history longer 
than the one we investigate here [33]. In its broadest sense, 
it could be applied to any medium that enhances 
interpersonal communication, from CB radios to Google 
Hangouts. In the early 2000s, blogs and then specific sites 
such as Friendster and MySpace were early social media 
ventures that shaped expectations for a participatory Web. 
But we classify “social media” the way it is now used 
colloquially, which is to refer to social networking sites, 
apps, and platforms. These, as defined by [11] allow 
individuals to create a public profile, build a network of 
connections, and “view and traverse” these connections 
and profiles (for elaboration, see [18]). By far the most 
popular and powerful of these, and indeed the standard by 
which all other social media are measured, is Facebook. 
Thus, social media as we know them took hold in 2006, the 
year when Facebook and Twitter, two of the most widely 
used social media platforms today, both became available 
to the general public. 
At that time, the relationship of social media to 
journalism was not immediately clear; researchers and 
industry observers were captivated by the potential of 
blogging, and the term “social media” wasn’t common 
parlance. When Facebook launched its algorithmically 
generated News Feed in 2006, becoming a dominant 
distributor of news was never the company’s desired goal 
[15]. But just a few years later, in the midst of a global 
recession, newsrooms everywhere—but particularly in the 
United States, where the prevailing news business models 
were heavily reliant on advertising revenue—began 
shrinking as advertisers and consumers cut their spending 
[29]. The question quickly became what could “save” 
journalism, and the immediate and expedient answer was 
social media (for some context, consider [5]). These 
platforms were experiencing exponential growth (Twitter, 
for instance, ballooned from a few million active users in 
2008 to more than 100 million in 2011), and newsmakers 
rushed to follow audiences there [63]. The thinking was 
that this new method of communication would enhance 
news distribution and enable stronger connections between 
journalists and their audiences [55]. Indeed, such hopes 
were the culmination of burgeoning expectations in the 
2000s, on the part of industry professionals and academics 
alike, that citizen engagement in news-making would 
rejuvenate journalism and democracy. Those expectations, 
as [68] explains in his article on “dark participation” in this 
special issue, have since proven to be wildly mistaken: 
“Media managers’ economic fantasies of a willing, free 
workforce were equally misguided as the rather naïve 
academic notions of a revitalized journalism in direct 
debate with its active users; both sacrificed empirical 
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realism for fantasies that were driven by their own goals 
and hopes resulting in either a greedy or an idealistic 
projection.” 
Now, a decade after social media was seen in some 
quarters as journalism’s savior as well as a vital catalyst for 
connection and social change broadly, it is being decried as 
a cesspool of misinformation and fake news (e.g., [32]). 
This rise and fall of social media is but one example of a 
tendency in journalism’s trade discourse to prop up a 
succession of technologies as the means of saving 
journalism (or at least markedly improving it). Over the 
years, multiple innovations have emerged as the thing that 
would rescue journalism, only to be replaced by the next 
idea: multimedia storytelling, customization and 
personalization, online video, mobile devices, mobile apps, 
paywalls, and now virtual and augmented reality. Each has 
come with overinflated expectations that were eventually 
tempered by a more modest appraisal [23]. Social media, 
however, has proven particularly persistent among 
journalists. Nearly all of them use social media in their 
work, and many say it is essential [85]. 
In parallel, researchers studying journalism and social 
media also jumped in with both feet in 2008, and have not 
lost interest. According to Google Scholar, the number of 
new research works mentioning social media and 
journalism to some degree nearly doubled each year from 
2008 (993 articles) to 2011 (5,440 articles). The number of 
new articles, chapters, and books peaked at 16,600 in 2016 
(see Figure 1). 
 
 
 
Figure 1. Number of search results for the 
query “‘social media’ journalism” in Google 
Scholar, accounting for new articles published 
in each of the years 2005 through 2017. 
 
This body of research on journalism and social media 
has multiple homes, including connections to sociology, 
behavioral economics, and psychology, as well as 
contemporary pursuits in political communication 
especially as well as media and communication studies 
broadly. Our assessment focuses on work within 
journalism studies, a field defined not merely by its topical 
focus on news but particularly by its exploration of the 
many contexts and processes through which journalism 
emerges [16]. This narrower focus on journalism studies 
has two reasons. First, journalism studies has become 
recognizable as its own field, distinct from others adjacent 
to it, much more recently than those mentioned above (e.g., 
the field’s two oldest journals, Journalism and Journalism 
Studies, were both founded in 2000). It is therefore 
incumbent on those working in this field to continue 
articulating and clarifying its basis for research, including 
especially the assumptions that underlie this work. Second, 
the field’s unique identity has been profoundly influenced 
by the study of journalism and social media, partially 
because journalism studies has grown up in the social 
media era. Thus, while other fields also study social media 
and journalism, the assumptions described here are of 
particular relevance to journalism studies and have not 
been examined explicitly within that field. This is 
particularly true of research that examines how social 
media are affecting journalism—e.g., studies of social 
media content that journalists produce, how journalists 
integrate social media into their work, social media as 
publishing platforms, and (to a lesser extent) news 
consumption on social media.  
These areas of research have by now developed 
consistent themes based on the assumptions outlined here. 
Studies of social media and journalism frequently rely on  
two overarching narratives, one addressing normalization 
and one addressing control. Normalization focuses on 
changes in how journalists themselves relate to their 
profession and its institutional role, while control focuses 
on changes in journalists’ relationships with their 
audiences and content. In both cases, the focus is on 
change, with the advent of digital communication—and 
specifically social media—being the fulcrum about which 
these changes have occurred. For instance, a greater 
adoption of social media is usually juxtaposed with a 
diminishing emphasis on “traditional” journalistic 
practices or roles. 
The narrative of normalization suggests that 
journalists using social media have in some cases imposed 
existing journalistic norms on the new platforms and in 
others adopted elements of social media as newly 
journalistic [46]. This has been called a “hybrid 
normalization” [8] as new platforms become more deeply 
integrated into journalistic routines. The focus, then, is to 
learn which things change and which do not as social media 
platforms mesh with journalism. Thus far, it appears that 
journalists still prefer to separate themselves from their 
audiences [57] but are willing to offer more opinion and 
personality [3][56]. The new normal on social media is also 
characterized by the hybrid mixing of contexts and 
practices as boundaries collapse between personal and 
professional, public and private [39]. In sum, longstanding 
journalistic conventions are being reconfigured on social 
media networks [40]. 
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The narrative of control explores who is in charge of 
news selection, construction, and distribution. With respect 
to news audiences, researchers have treated social media as 
a boon, one resulting in more access, more personalization, 
more interactivity, and the possibility to embed news and 
conversations about it in social networks [41]. This 
increase in the audience’s power comes in part as 
journalists’ gatekeeping and agenda-setting influences 
wane [72]. When news is created and distributed outside 
the institutional logic of journalism [39], tensions arise 
between journalists’ desire for professional control and 
audiences’ abilities to circumvent it [47]. These tensions 
are exemplified by the question of who is a journalist and 
what qualifies as journalism in a world where the 
boundaries seem less fixed and more fluid [14]. In recent 
years, however, the question of control has become 
particularly pronounced in the context of publishing and 
distribution [2]: Once news is made by journalists, who 
controls how it moves and where it appears across various 
platforms (legacy and new, proprietary and non-
proprietary, etc.) as well as how it is monetized 
accordingly? As digital intermediaries, especially Google 
and Facebook, control the primary distribution channels as 
well as an ever-larger share of digital advertising revenues, 
they exert wider control over the public visibility and 
economic viability of news. This is much to the confusion 
and consternation of news media organizations that 
simultaneously fear missing out on the massive audiences 
offered by such platforms but also worry about the long-
term trade-offs of allowing technology companies to 
supersede them as publishers [62][7]. In all, social media 
has been understood as a conduit by which audiences and 
social media firms themselves have siphoned off some of 
journalists’ power and control over news production and 
distribution by shifting these processes to platforms that 
news organizations  don’t own. 
Against this backdrop of a decade of research on social 
media in journalism studies, we ask: What has not been 
accounted for adequately? This essay identifies three 
assumptions embedded in this line of research that need 
further questioning. At times, journalists, policymakers, 
and pundits also make assertions based on these 
assumptions, but we are concerned here with identifying 
what these assumptions mean for journalism studies 
particularly. As researchers seek to track and explain key 
developments in this area, what scents, as it were, have 
been lost amid the prevailing winds? There may be other 
assumptions embedded in the literature that merit scrutiny; 
these, however, appear to be the most salient and also the 
most likely to inhibit a more realistic and reflexive agenda 
for the study of social media and journalism moving 
forward. Finally, as authors, we are not immune to critique 
in this process. Having published many studies in this area, 
including one of the most-cited works on journalists’ use 
of Twitter [46], we are well aware that we have contributed 
to the some of the problems outlined below and thus, akin 
to Witschge and colleagues [87], are “dealing with the 
mess (we made)” as self-critically as possible. 
3. Assumption 1: Social media would be a 
net positive 
 
If the main narratives around social media in 
journalism studies focus on change, it is usually assumed 
that such change will be for the better. Researchers have 
suggested that social media would become a primary 
enabler of greater transparency [66][69], reciprocity [49], 
and openness in journalism [48]. Social media should allow 
journalism to achieve a wider reach [41] and greater 
immediacy [89]. Some of this potential has been realized, 
but much of it has not. Social media has been a gold mine 
of source material [26], with some limited evidence that it 
may upend journalists’ traditional reliance on official 
sources [42][65]—though the use of social media for 
sourcing tends to happen more in extraordinary events 
rather than in everyday reporting [6]. And, social media 
platforms play an indispensable role in circulating breaking 
news, particularly in crisis situations (e.g., [83]). But, on 
the other hand, the torrent of information is often so 
extreme that rather than attempt to verify content on social 
media, some journalists simply wait for other, larger news 
outlets to do so [12]. Social media provide the possibility 
of a new form of “live” journalism [89], and yet journalists 
live-tweeting the 2012 U.S. presidential debates spent less 
time fact-checking candidate claims and more time making 
jokes [22]. 
Beyond the problem of unrealized potential is the 
concern that major lines of research have all but baked in 
implicit optimism regarding social media. Researchers 
tend to assume, for example, that virtually all forms of 
journalist-audience interaction—by various approaches 
labeled engagement [58], participation [11], reciprocity 
[49], and more—are positive, in part because such 
interactions contribute to diminishing the much-maligned 
mask of objectivity, neutrality, and detachedness behind 
which journalistic work is black-boxed to public view (for 
a fuller discussion of notions such as “transparency is the 
new objectivity,” see [84]). There are, of course, pro-social 
outcomes that may flow when audience members engage 
with journalists, such as the improvement in civility that 
emerges after journalists actively engage with the public in 
online comment sections [76]. But, based on our fieldwork, 
interviews, and observations, journalist-audience 
interactions may be overwhelmingly negative for 
journalists (let alone for users), and in ways not fully 
captured in the literature thus far. 
Perhaps most salient among these problematic 
interactions are the many forms of harassment that are 
endemic to social media generally and increasingly a 
concern for journalists as well. Journalists on social 
media—particularly female and minority journalists, and 
particularly on Twitter—are frequently targeted by trolls 
and other malicious actors [74]. “They’re smart, they’re 
relentless, they’ll find you,” one Washington Post 
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journalist told us about the trolls.2 While researchers have 
begun to study harassment and the forms it takes for 
journalists on social media [19], journalism studies has yet 
to reconcile what this means for the larger power dynamics 
on social media: who gets to speak, with what impact, and 
with what degree of accountability. For example, Robinson 
[70] suggests that power and privilege play a far greater 
part in negotiating roles among journalists, activists, and 
publics than previously acknowledged in journalism 
studies. And, what if, as increasingly appears to be the case, 
being on social media has predominantly meant putting 
oneself at the potential mercies of the “Twitter mob” 
[86]—a form of moral outrage that, while as old as the 
human species itself, has become accelerated in the age of 
social media [24]. Moreover, Massanari’s [51] study of the 
#Gamergate controversy, while not directly about 
journalism, points to two missed opportunities in 
journalism studies on social media: the relative neglect of 
Reddit as a social platform for study as well as the 
misogynistic subcultures that from Reddit spread to far 
parts of the social web. In all, in mostly focusing on the 
journalistic practices and audience interactions afforded by 
social media, journalism scholars have assumed positivity 
and thereby misread toxicity, particularly when it comes to 
gendered harassment. 
The assumption that social media would be a net 
positive for journalism is also manifest in the industry logic 
that everyone should be there, which is felt keenly by 
journalists [45]. This normative “should” extends to 
research as well, especially when those studying 
technology adoption in newsrooms or other journalistic 
routines assume that those who do not use social media will 
be left out or left behind. The danger in this, of course, is 
that social media amplify journalism’s pack mentality [25] 
in both scope and force, a fact sometimes overlooked in 
journalism studies. Journalists are regularly accused of 
piling on (focusing too much on one thing) or being 
thoroughly distracted (focusing on the wrong thing). The 
case is particularly acute when the president of the United 
States, already a subject of intense journalistic attention, 
has a habit of making provocative and controversial 
statements on Twitter. The upshot is that journalists now 
consider social media spats to be urgent, breaking news—
prompting them, for example, to send push notifications to 
smartphone users informing them that Donald Trump and 
his former FBI director are calling each other names. This 
pack mentality on social media remains understudied by 
journalism scholars, as does a related problem: the 
journalist’s relationship to the so-called “filter bubble.” 
Seeing only part of the world because you are ensconced in 
an echo chamber was initially a point of concern regarding 
citizens in going online [78]. But following a flurry of 
studies on the phenomenon of fake news after the 2016 
U.S. presidential election (among them, [1]), it appears 
likely that echo chambers are more evident among 
journalists themselves, rather than ordinary users of social 
                                               
2 Personal communication, 28 February 2018. 
media. Audiences are actually exposed to a wider range of 
opinions and sources than might be expected [31], while 
journalists talk mainly to each other [57]. Moreover, 
network science research has found “a modest correlation 
between the ideologies of who a journalist follows on 
Twitter and the content he or she produces” [88]—a 
connection that has yet to be explored in journalism 
studies. 
The industry logic that everyone must be on social 
media plays out at organizational and institutional levels as 
well. Our own fieldwork and interviews have shown that 
journalists are strongly encouraged or even forced to use 
social media, as supervisors begin to count how often 
journalists post and how widely these posts spread. 
Surprisingly, given the time involved in developing a social 
media brand, the return on this time investment is rarely 
questioned, either in the trade press or in the research 
literature. A notable exception is Chyi’s work examining 
the value of online news, mobile news, and social media 
relative to other forms of news consumption and 
engagement (e.g., [43][20]); the findings often suggest that 
returns are well below the industry’s hopes. Is it possible 
that audiences don’t want or aren’t impressed by 
journalists’ online engagement (cf. [58])? Or, even in the 
best case, where journalists use social media to the full 
potential that scholars attribute to it, is it possible that the 
benefits to journalism are small relative to other 
investments of effort? Or simply that the power of social 
media platforms and their control over data collection and 
revenue generation make it unlikely, if not impossible, to 
build a business model under such conditions [7]? Overall, 
journalism studies has not sufficiently accounted for the 
time displacement of journalistic labor caused by a focus 
on social media. For example, it’s worth considering: what 
are journalists not doing because they are managing social 
media? Such a question may be purely hypothetical, but it 
bears asking when assumptions of positive results from 
social media can lead researchers away from evaluating the 
tradeoffs of time, talent, and attention. 
 
4. Assumption 2: Social media reflects reality 
 
It is now common for journalists to point to social 
media posts, particularly tweets, as an indicator of what 
people are saying [4][13][30]. The logic is that Twitter is a 
modern version of person-on-the-street interviews, or even 
a journalistic stand-in for actual polling. While this was 
never a reliable way of gauging public opinion, the fact that 
Twitter makes these vox populi searchable and embeddable 
vastly reduces the effort that it takes to collect and call upon 
them. Its use has proliferated to the point that journalists 
see Twitter as a reliable source of news [53]. Indeed, as the 
Columbia Journalism Review acknowledged, in reporting 
on many news organizations erroneously embedding 
tweets from the infamous Internet Research Agency in 
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Russia, “American media outlets have a Twitter problem. 
The problem is not journalists’ notorious addiction to the 
platform—it’s their use of tweets as a way to include 
opinions from ‘ordinary people.’ Often, these ordinary 
people turn out not to be ‘ordinary’ or ‘people’ at all” [81]. 
In a similar vein, researchers have too often assumed 
that social media networks are a reasonable approximation 
of public opinion or other aspects of the (offline) social 
world. Most commonly, perhaps, this manifests itself in the 
use of social media to represent public sentiment in agenda-
setting studies (e.g., [73][59], even while many such 
studies readily acknowledge that they may not be accurate 
representations of the public. More broadly, several studies 
have attempted to use social media chatter as a predictor of 
election results (for a review, see [34]), and, in general, 
scholars have turned to social media posts and related trace 
data as evidence of what people are thinking or feeling. The 
problem, as [37] shows, is that bigger data is not 
necessarily better data: because people do not choose to use 
particular social media platforms at random, samples 
drawn from such spaces are inherently limited in their 
generalizability. 
As such, Twitter, the most popular platform for U.S. 
journalists and the most popular for studies of journalism 
on social media, is demonstrably not representative of the 
public [54][44]. It’s more appropriate to think of Twitter as 
a public, rather than the public. While that concern is by 
now well understood, the broader composition and 
representation of social media publics is more complicated 
still, and has eluded many researchers examining social 
media and journalism. For example, some studies suggest 
that power dynamics and hegemony at work on social 
media shape which voices are present and which are heard 
(e.g., [62]). Media and other elites, in particular, have 
greater power and reach than the average social media 
user—even in cases, such as Andy Carvin’s use of Twitter 
during the 2011 Arab Spring, when journalists presumably 
might be sourcing more non-elite opinion than usual [42]. 
In fact, it is common for social media metrics to quantify 
one’s “influence,” and in some cases this authority is 
institutionalized and made visible through a “verified” 
status (as in the blue checkmark on Twitter). In all, a more 
direct reckoning with the sharp differences that can exist 
among users has often been overlooked in this line of 
research. While some have attempted to separate groups in 
analysis of Twitter content [52], it is far more common to 
see social media publics treated as homogeneous wholes. 
To develop such broad characterizations obscures the 
power differentials that shape both who speaks and, more 
importantly, who is heard on social media (for further 
discussion, see [70]). It also may disregard subcultures and 
minority groupings such as Black Twitter [71]; these sub-
networks are embedded within larger social media publics 
but may have unique characteristics and behaviors of their 
own [21]. This is to say nothing of those groups that are not 
online and thus simply are left out of any analysis of social 
media content. 
The larger question is whether social media content, 
in any of its forms, is in fact an accurate representation of 
reality as it is lived and experienced by those creating the 
content. As journalists draw on evermore user content to 
gauge public sentiment and to tell stories about events at 
home and abroad, they are being trained to follow elaborate 
procedures for checking and verifying social media content 
as factual in a news context [6]. But it may be worth 
researchers’ effort to consider whether social media 
content, even most of the time, is posted in good faith [38]. 
Efforts to manipulate public opinion in recent elections are 
an obvious example of this concern [1], but it appears at 
least possible that many social media users are motivated 
not by a desire to accurately express themselves or their 
observations but to perform an identity as a way of 
belonging [15]. These performances, as all front-stage 
social performances [36], are curated and crafted to achieve 
a particular end. This is particularly evident among social 
media “influencers” who go to great lengths to make their 
vlogs, Instagram photos, and selfies appear as natural and 
therefore “authentic” as possible, thereby influencing both 
the narrative that journalists convey about how “ordinary” 
people might get lucky and strike it rich as a YouTuber, 
while also masking the actual labor, precarity, and always-
on performativity behind the scenes [28]. It might also be 
that people simply act differently when online than they do 
in other social settings, emboldened by an “online 
disinhibition effect” [77]. Altogether, what people think 
and feel, and what they post on social media, may be two 
different things. Researchers should not only acknowledge 
these limitations but avoid research designs that treat social 
media content as a reflection of reality. 
 
5. Assumption 3: Social media matters over 
and above other factors 
 
The assumptions outlined so far suggest that, in the 
broad literature on journalism and social media during the 
past decade, there has been a two-part implicit expectation 
in many studies. First, that social media would be a net 
positive for journalism as an institution, for journalists as 
individuals, and for closer interactions with community 
members. And, second, that social media activities reflect 
something meaningful about the social world—that while 
Twitter publics and the like are by no means pure proxies 
for the populace, they are reasonable approximations that 
are therefore worth taking seriously. As we have noted 
already, both of those assumptions could be true in certain 
cases or under certain circumstances, and they are implicit 
in our own work. However, if we step back to question the 
surety of such assumptions, we are led to wonder: Has the 
journalism studies field paid too much attention to social 
media? And if so, what forces and factors in journalism’s 
digital transformation have been neglected as a result? 
Thus, the third and final assumption to untangle here 
is the assumption that, for the study of journalism, the 
phenomenon of social media matters in a singular way, 
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over and above other factors. On one level, as with other 
forms of technologically oriented work in contemporary 
journalism, of course social media platforms, practices, and 
personnel matter. The decade-long dedication of resources, 
to a greater and greater degree, by journalists, their 
employers, and people at large virtually requires that 
journalism scholars pay attention to such developments. 
And indeed they have, as Figure 1 attests and as reviews 
such as Hermida’s [39][40] chronicle in great detail. On 
another level, however, that journalism studies as a field 
has been consumed with studying how journalists tweet, 
like, and share implies a certain determinism in this 
arrangement: that social media has made an impact on 
journalistic perceptions and practices that matters over and 
above other types of influence that might otherwise have 
been chronicled if scholars had turned their gaze in another 
direction. Or, perhaps with greater consequence, we as 
researchers have attributed to social media credit and 
blame that rightly belongs elsewhere, amid the many sea-
changes washing over journalism in recent years. 
Consider first the extent to which journalism studies 
has been preoccupied with social media and its associated 
dimensions. As Steensen and Ahva ([75], p. 1) note in their 
meta-analysis of the field, the latest movement in research 
on digital journalism has been focused on the “news 
ecosystem,” the “news landscape,” and “ambient” and 
“networked” forms of journalism—“all of which,” they 
argue, “have emerged because of practices predominantly 
related to social media.” The result, Steensen and Ahva 
[75] suggest, has been a widespread examination of the 
theories by which scholars make sense of journalism. 
While no doubt positive for the conceptual development of 
journalism as an area of study, this emphasis on practices 
afforded by fluid social media spaces perhaps has led 
researchers to overlook some pressing issues that span 
academic, industry, and policy concerns. For example, 
taking the 2017 Future of Journalism conference as an 
informal proxy for what journalism studies is actually 
studying today (and what it’s not), [60] shows how studies 
of business models, innovation, and entrepreneurship are 
conspicuously absent. Moreover, while there is great 
emphasis on media practices amid social media, including 
emerging patterns of disinformation, he finds far less focus 
on the power of platform companies and their structural 
transformation of the information environment as a whole 
(see [7][61]. Thus, time spent analyzing tweets could be 
coming at the expense of analyzing the logics of 
algorithms, the political economy of technology giants, and 
other organizational and institutional arrangements that are 
reshaping the contexts for news subsidy (some recent 
examples include [35][82]. The powers we observe in 
social media platforms may in fact be wielded by their 
makers, markets, or even cultural shifts that are masked by 
a preoccupation with social media. 
Furthermore, the field’s focus on social media, its 
micro-practices and journalist-audience interactions, 
assumes that such things matter because they reflect 
earnest engagement between journalism and its publics in 
a deeply normative sense. As [38] deftly show, however, 
researchers may have been deceived in assuming an 
“earnest Internet.” By this, they mean that “communication 
scholarship generally posits that people act rationally and 
in good faith; care about facts, truth, and authenticity; 
pursue ends in line with their political and social values and 
aspirations; and, more philosophically, are fundamentally 
good” (p. 1057). But then the 2016 U.S. election happened. 
Not only did it reveal a social media ecosystem coursing 
with racism, misogyny, and other ugliness, but it also 
revealed, they argue, that such expressions were often 
voiced “for the lulz”—not out of sincere political interest, 
but rather a more ambiguous aim of provoking for its own 
sake. Building on Phillips and Milner’s [67] book The 
Ambivalent Internet, [38] argue that, in contemporary 
digital culture, “we cannot be certain of anyone’s intent or 
motivations, meaning is indeterminate, accountability is 
nearly impossible, and the social and antisocial are 
intertwined” (p. 1058). Thus, it is ambivalence, not 
earnestness, that may be the orienting ethos of platforms 
increasingly marked by mischief, oddities, and 
antagonism. The upshot, they suggest, is a corrosive 
undermining of social trust, not merely on social media. 
“This goes far beyond the loss of trust in journalism or even 
institutions; it cuts to the heart of everyday social relations 
and public discourse” (p. 1058). If true, this re-evaluation 
calls into question the scores of studies on journalism and 
social media that carry an underlying assumption that 
social media matters—and matters quite a lot—because it 
represents an earnest extension of the public sphere. 
 
6. Conclusion 
 
To be clear, we are not suggesting that a decade of 
journalism studies research on social media has been for 
naught. Social media, by virtue of its vast diffusion, clearly 
matters for social life at large and for news in particular. In 
this essay, however, we are questioning the assumptions 
and associated blind spots that have developed in this 
research, and thus we argue that scholars—ourselves 
included—can be more critically reflexive in making sense 
of social media’s impact for journalism as an institution, 
for journalists as individual media workers; for users, 
audiences, and communities engaged in news; and for the 
character of public discourse. In journalism studies 
especially but in the wider study of mediated conversations 
and communication research as well, scholars have too 
easily assumed that social media would be a net positive, 
reflects reality, and ultimately matters over and above other 
factors. These issues are exacerbated when journalism 
studies fails to connect itself to and build upon the work of 
adjacent fields also grappling with similar questions, 
including especially political communication research. 
These assumptions, even while implicit, may be 
clouding our collective judgment and obscuring issues that 
otherwise call out for our attention. Indeed, in emphasizing 
the assumedly pro-social audience engagement or in 
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fixating on the micro-practices of journalists’ use of 
platforms, scholars too often have overlooked the gendered 
toxicity, the intra-journalistic insularity, and the 
overwhelming power of platform companies, among other 
concerns. Thus, in prioritizing social media activities 
above other factors, scholars arguably have given less 
attention to a number of critical issues that may be more 
consequential for the future of journalism—from matters 
of organizational innovation and business models to 
broader questions about how institutions and ideologies are 
constructing the internet architecture on which public 
conversations take place. 
Ultimately, the explosive growth in research on social 
media and journalism can be linked with the similarly 
remarkable growth of journalism studies, a field of inquiry 
that is less than 20 years old as an institutionalized entity 
and is only now beginning to exhibit particular scholarly 
commitments [16]. Both are young and maturing areas of 
research, and are evolving in tandem with social, political, 
economic, and (especially) technological dynamics that 
can vary widely around the world. And, just as journalism 
studies has been dominated by perspectives from the 
Global North, the study of social media and journalism 
likewise has been limited not only by the underlying 
assumptions we have articulated here, but also by case 
studies that too often fail to include adequate diversity on 
matters of geography, culture, and language as well as race, 
class, and gender. As scholars extend their view to new 
contexts and conditions, they may well find additional 
ways of challenging the taken-for-granted assumptions of 
social media research. 
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